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1.  The significance ofjudicial decisions on access 
The issue of access to children, following the breakdown of their parents' 
relationship, is often amongst the most intractable and worrying problems 
confronting practitioners of Family Law. In particular, if hostility exists between 
the parents, the question of continuing access may often provide the source 
and opportunity for the continuation of that hostility (which, needless to say, 
can pose a considerable threat to the welfare of the children). 
In issues of access it is always hoped that disagreements can be resolved 
without the necessity of a Court hearing and determination; a Court hearing 
is always a matter of last resort. Even if the disagreement should necessitate 
a judicial determination, the Court must, by virtue of section 23 of the 
Guardianship Act 1968, treat the welfare of the particular child as "the first 
and paramount consideration". This inevitably means, as the Court of Appeal 
noted in Wheeler v. Wheeler,[ that the issues raised in access (or custody) 
are of "fact and discretion"; and it is consequently widely felt that there are 
no legal principles governing access, other than the paramountcy principle. 
Most lawyers practising in family law would therefore readily agree that: 
"clients' questions about what to do about access are more properly answered using knowledge 
of child psychology and family dynamics than knowledge of legal  precedent^".^ 
Similarly, it has been judicially observed that reported cases on section 
23 of the Guardianship Act 1968, possess little utilitarian value as precedents 
or guides, but rather have an important "cultural value" for those engaged 
in Family Law work.3 
It can be argued, however, that the value accorded the reported case-law 
on access should be somewhat higher than one of cultural interest. For whilst 
considerable respect and deference must inevitably be paid to the assessment 
and expertise of child psychologists in any determination of an individual 
child's welfare, the lawyers and, ultimately, the judges, involved in any access 
case do enjoy an expertise in the law which, by virtue of their very involvement, 
can be assumed to have relevance in the resolution of the dispute. The law 
has not been completely abandoned in favour of social science, and there 
are some good reasons why it should not be. 
First, child psychologists, like any other professionals, do not and cannot 
aspire to infallibility, either individually or collectively. It is a trite observation 
that the wisdom of social science today may, in the future, be perceived to 
be folly, and on many questions relating to access there is evidence of clear 
divergence and of dramatic changes of opinion amongst respected social 
I (1988) 5 N.Z.F.L.R. 380, at 382. 
Jill Burrett, Child Access and Modern Family Law (1988) at 44. 
B v. B[1978] 1 N.Z.L.R. 285, at 290 per Jeffries J. 
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scientists.4 Thus Judges, acting as "the reasonable judicial parent'% and 
attempting to hold fast to "fundamental common sense'" can provide a valuable 
counterpoise. Moreover, the courts, by virtue of their role in our legal system, 
can still legitimately perform a moral, educative function in propounding what 
constitutes reasonable parenting behaviour - a function inappropriate for 
private, professional practitioners. The potential dangers with judicial intuition 
inherent in these supervisory functions are minimised if decision-making is 
undertaken in the context of a culture of case-law. derived from the collective 
wisdom of other members of the judiciary. 
Secondly, the reported case-law provides a public, visible framework of 
guidelines under which all parties involved in a particular case can operate. 
Whilst firm rules are clearly impossible in dealing with human relationships, 
a framework of case-law can assist professionals, whether legally trained or 
not, to advise and make recommendations in a way which is consistent with 
a likely judicial outcome. The parties themselves may also have an added 
incentive to reach agreement and to avoid a judicial hearing, if, in at least 
some cases, they appreciate the outcome of such a hearing is reasonably 
predictable. Equally, guidelines on access can, on appropriate occasions, be 
"very helpful" to a deciding Judge.7 
Third, and perhaps most obviously, the body of case-law provides some 
minimal, visible protection against the outcome of an access dispute being 
dependent upon the length of a psychologist's or judge's foot. Whilst the 
circumstances of a particular child in a particular family must naturally dictate 
the ultimate solution in any access dispute, it is also important that both 
children and parents should be treated reasonably consistently throughout 
the country. For such reasons, the case-law on access has a value beyond 
the merely peripheral, and this brief article seeks to examine some of the 
trends which have emerged from judicial decisions, as reported until the end 
of 1989. 
2. A parental right of access? 
Until the 1970s it was not uncommon for access to be seen as a "right" 
of the non-custodial parent.8 However, in the important English case M v. 
M9 Wrangham J. declared it would be preferable to describe access as ". . . 
a basic right in the child rather than a basic right in the parent"; and that 
view was adopted by later English courts. Whilst that change in perspective 
Consider, for example, the trenchant criticism of the findings and methodology of an 
acclaimed book co-authored by Judith Wallerstein, Second Chances: Men, Women, and 
Children a Decade after Divorce (1989), by her former co-author of the celebrated and 
highly influential study Surviving the Break-up (1980): (1989) 27 Family and Conciliation 
Courts Review 81. Consider, in turn, the conclusions on access of Goldstein, Freud and 
Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (1973). 
See this description of the Court's task given by Lord Upjohn in J v. C [I9701 A.C. 668, 
at 723 per Lord Upjohn. 
6 Note Judith Wallerstein's important warning to the Association of Family and Conciliation 
Courts Conference, 1988, on the lack of psychological theory relevant to child development 
in families after divorce, and her plea for adherence in the meantime to "fundamental common 
sense": (1989) 27 Family and Conciliation Courts Review 15, 16. See also Second Chances, 
supra n.4, p. 312. 
Re W (A Minor)(Access) 119891 1 F.L.R. 163, at 166 per Heilbron J; though her Honour 
did stress the importance of personalisation in the resolution of access disputes. 
See, for example, Re McS (An Infant) (1950) G.L.R. 32 per Northcroft J., and S v. S 
and P 119621 2 All E.R. I ,  at 3 per Willmer L.J. 
[I9731 2 All E.R. 81, at 85. 
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was certainly significant, and consistent with the paramountcy principle, the 
practical effect of the pronouncement was not great. For in his judgment 
Wrangham J.  went on to declare that the Court would be "extremely slow" 
to deprive the child of access,l0 and this approach inevitably resulted in the 
continuation of the presumption of access. 
In New Zealand, it is easy enough to discover judgments which describe 
access as a "right" of the child.I1 Equally, it is rare to find a judgment describing 
access as a "right" of the non-custodial parent.12 But many Judges would 
undoubtedly have agreed with Principal Family Court Judge Trapski when 
he deprecated the discussion of "rights" in this context as being a "largely 
academic" exercise. 13 
Yet the House of Lords in a recent judgment, which can be expected to 
be persuasive in New Zealand, has once more raised the issue, and has provided 
a juristic analysis of access that, if anything, leans more towards the concept 
of parental "rights". In Re KD (a minor)I4 Lord Oliver was certainly quick 
to declare that the paramountcy principle tends to deprive any so-called 
parental "right" of real substance, but he did hold that 
"[als a general proposition a natural parent has a claim to access to his or her child to which 
the court will pay regard and it would not. . . be inappropriate to describe such a claim as 
a 'right' ".IS 
Although, as his Lordship emphasised, the "right" could be displaced if 
the interests of the child so required, the positing of access "rights" as "parental" 
may well possess a significance beyond the semantic. 
For example, if access were to be presented in terms of the child's right 
(albeit one which was clearly unenforceable by the child) then, in theory, 
a child who was reluctant to have contact with the noncustodial parent should 
presumably have the capacity to forego that right - whatever the reason 
for that reluctance might be. The non-custodial parent, even if loving and 
capable, would thereby be placed in a very weak position. Conversely, if access 
were presented in terms of a parental right (subject always to the paramountcy 
principle) then reluctance or upset on the part of the child would not be 
as decisive - the reasons for the reluctance would be highly relevant, and 
the parental position would be much stronger. 
Moreover, if the claimlright were to be presented as a parental one, then 
it could be argued that access should normally granted, provided only that 
the child was not demonstrably harmed by it. The question would not be 
whether any demonstrable "advantageM or "benefit" inured to the child (as 
was suggested, for example, by Barker J. in Collis v. Collis).I6 Rather, if 
the claimlright were indeed parental, the principle would be akin to that 
suggested by Jeffries J. in R v. C,'7 namely: 
-1s a starting point of principle in family law a parent is entitled to access to a child unless 
there are grave and weighty reasons why access should be denied''. 
10 Ibid. 
1 1  See, for example, D v. D (1985) 1 F.R.N.Z. 699, at 703 per Barker J., Morris v. Hawkin 
(1986) 2 F.R.N.Z. 545, at 547 per Holland J., and Sharmpn v. Sharman (1988) 5 N.Z.F.L.R. 
91, at 92 per Anderson J., where his Honour described the "right" as "paramount". 
12 But, for an example, see E v. E F.L.N.- 154 (2d.) per Judge Ryan. 
' 3  S v S F.L.N.- 83 (2d.). 
' 4  [I9881 1 All E.R. 577. 
' 5  Ibid., at 590. 
16 (1986) 3 F.R.N.Z. 41, at 43, 44. 
l7  (1986) 2 F.R.N.Z. 8, at 12. 
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In other words, access, even if resisted by the children, would only be denied 
in the "most extraordinary circumstances"l8 and where the children's interests 
"physical or mental" would be harmed by it.19 
3. R e  relationship to guardianship 
The aforementioned judicial approach would obviously strengthen the 
position of the non-custodial parent (normally the father)20 in any access dispute 
with the custodial parent. It would also be consistent with the argument of 
some Family court judges concerning the fundamental guardianship rights 
enacted by the Guardianship Act 1968. In particular, Judge Inglis QC has 
persistently contended that when, as is normal, the non-custodial parent retains 
guardianship rights, then he or she can only exercise those rights in a meaningful 
or adequate way if there is access to the child.21 Accepting that to be so, 
then it is only if access would prove actually harmful to the child's welfare 
that it should be curtailed, and, his Honour has indicated, such a situation 
of consequential harm might in turn raise the question of whether sole 
guardianship should be vested in the custodial parent.22 But, by section lO(2) 
of the Guardianship Act 1968, termination of parental guardianship could 
not be ordered unless the Court was satisfied that the non-custodial parent 
was for some grave reason unfit to be the guardian of the child, or was unwilling 
to exercise the responsibilities of guardian.23 By inference, then, that stringent 
test would also serve as the test for denial of access. 
Obviously, this reasoning on guardianship has some strength. Prior to 
separation, both parents have an association with the child which enables 
their guardianship responsibilities to be exercised. For practical purposes, 
and in the absence of grave parental failure, the parental right of association 
could be fairly described as pre-eminent. Although a child psychologist or 
Judge might feel, if consulted, that the child's welfare would be enhanced 
if the child were raised by an adult other than one or both natural parents, 
a parent cannot be deprived of the right of association with the child - 
even if the child would also desire this -unless grave, exceptional circumstances 
exist. It is onlv if the matter should reach the Court. because of the event 
of separation, that the Court, bound by the paramountcy principle of section 
23, can supervise the parental claim and can then dictate, or deny, access. 
Bearing in mind that a custody order is very different from an adoption 
order, consideration of the parental rights and responsibilities before separation 
can be seen as highly relevant in any judicial consideration of the rights 
and responsibilities after separation. 
On this view, then, access and guardianship would be the norm both before 
and after separation, and neither would be denied in the absence of exceptional 
circumstances. That would not necessarily require the Court to overlook the 
paramountcy principle. For, as Judge Boshier emphasised in Shannon v. 
Shannon,24 to deny fundamental guardianship rights without proper cause 
would " . . . unquestionably not be in the best interests of the children". 
l8  As stated by Holland J. in H v. C (1986) 2 F.R.N.Z 32, at 35. 
l 9  Ibid. See further Morris v. Hawkin, supra, n. 11, at 548 and C v. C F.L.N. -64(2d.). 
20 See Gabrielle Maxwell Paternal Custody (1989) 2 B.F.L.B. 35. 
2 1  See, for example, his judgments in Pooley v. Llewelyn (1985) 3 N.Z.F.L.R. 628, F v. E 
F.L.N.-I51 (2d.), and M v. H F,L.N.-190(2d.). 
22 See, for example, the judgments of D v. D, F.L.N. - 168 (2d.) and T v. T F.L.N.-114(2d.). 
23 Consider, in particular, the significant comments of Judge Inglis QC in Makariri v. Roxburgh 
(1988) 4 N.Z.F.L.R. 673, at 680 - 683. 
24 (1988) 5 NZFLR 305, at 316. 
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Consistent with this emphasis on guardianship rights and responsibilities 
is the interesting argument initially put forward by Judge Inglis QC, and 
now favoured by Judges Boshier and von Dadelszen, to the effect that the 
very notions of "custody" and "access" are inconsistent with the concept of 
joint guardianship, and indeed could possibly be dispensed with. Where there 
is a dispute, it is said, the Court should consider eschewing the jurisdiction 
conferred by section 11 and 15 of the Guardianship Act 1968 (to make custody 
or access orders), and should instead consider utilising the jurisdiction 
conferred by section 13 of the statute to give directions as to the allocation 
of guardianship responsibilities.25 (Such an approach, it is suggested, may 
also have the added advantage of proving to be more responsive to the values 
of the Maori community).26 
4.  7;he welfare of the child: long-term or short-term? 
The paramountcy principle is, of course, at the heart of any access or custody 
dispute. Regrettably, the principle is considerably easier to enunciate than 
define. As Jeffries J. stated in A v. A,27 the concept of the "welfare of the 
child" may be ". . . seductive in its simplicity, but in reality conceals a most 
complex and far reaching judgment". 
As is well-known, the application of this amorphous test is essentially 
dependent upon the situation of the particular child in the particular family. 
But, in the context of access, an important trend has become apparent: it 
appears that the Courts will generally prefer to take a long-term view of a 
child's welfare.28 The cases thus suggest that the Court should seek to concern 
itself with the whole life of the child, rather than with the immediate few 
months after the making of an order? To cite Judge Inglis QC in F v. E 3 0  
". . . painful short-term measures may sometimes be necessary in order to 
achieve a child's true welfare in the long term". 
The reasoning is therefore clear: the terms welfare and happiness are not 
invariably interchangeable. Whilst a child may endure short-term unhappiness 
or superficial "trauma" from court-ordered access, it is nevertheless often 
perceived that the child's long-term welfare may sometimes dictate that an 
order should be made.31 There are various factors relevant here. First and 
foremost, it is considered that children will at some time wish to seek out 
and form some relationship with their non-custodial parent; and it is felt 
that the longer the non-custodial parent is kept away from the child, the 
harder it will be to develop that relation~hip.3~ It is also considered that 
the emotional development of children will, generally speaking, be enhanced 
by continuing contact with both parents. The children are thereby enabled 
to know their biological roots, and to know for themselves what their non- 
25 See, for example, Makariri v. Roxburgh, supra n.23; also Franklin v. Franklin (1988) 4 
F.R.N.Z. 466, at 470 - 472 per Judge Boshier and B v. P (1988) 5 N.Z.F.L.R. 462, at 
472474 per Judge von Dadelszen. 
2 W a k a r i r i  v. Roxburgh, ibid., at 684. 
27 119781 1 N.Z.L.R. 278, at 281. 
2* Consider, for example, D v. D (1985) 1 F.R.N.Z. 699, at 703, M v. M (1983) 2 N.Z.F.L.R. 
145, at 154, G v. Adams and G (1985) 2 F.R.N.Z. 14, at 15 F v. E, supra n. 21, at N. 
219,, and Shannon v. Shannon supra n. 24, at 318 . 
29 See the comment of Holland J. to this effect in H v. C, supra n. 18, at 35. 
3" Supra 11.21, at N 219. 
3' Consider, further, the comments in D v. D (1985) 1 F.R.N.Z. 699, at 703 per Barker J., 
and in E v. E F.L.N-154 (2d.) per Judge Ryan. 
3 2  Morris v. Hawkin, supra n. I I ,  at 548. 
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custodial parent is really like.3This desire to know one's roots has been 
judicially described by Anderson J. in Sharman v. Sharman34 as "[a]lmost 
an atavistic compulsion", and it is, of course, familiar enough in the adoption 
context. 
Moreover, the vagaries and chances of life for any given child can never 
be predicted. To take one of the worst hypotheses, it is conceivable the present 
custodial parent could die during the period of childhood; if the child has 
lost contact with the other parent, this would effectively render the child an 
orphan.35 
An occasional judicial suggestion (of a more paternalistic kind) is also 
sometimes made to the effect that the long-term interests of a child may require 
the inculcation of a sense of duty, responsibility and self-discipline. On this 
view (which might not be shared by all modern child psychologists) a child's 
reluctance to see his or her parent may be overridden by the child's duty 
and responsibility to that parent; and, implicitly, a child's development and 
character is assumed to be enhanced by fulfilment of that re~ponsibility.~~ 
The argument, as stated, neatly illustrates the difficulty in the application 
of the welfare test (adopting either a long- or short-term perspective). For, 
quite apart from the problem of applying generalisations to an individual 
access case, there is the difficulty in formulating the apt generalisation. Can 
anyone state with absolute certainty that a child's welfare is more likely to 
be promoted if the child has a sense of personal warmth and happiness, than 
if he or she has a sense of moral discipline and responsibility? Can anyone 
with absolute certainty state the converse? 
Whilst the above description of the case-law has tended to suggest that 
the courts will normally consider access to be in the child's long-term welfare, 
it is, needless to say, not difficult to find cases where the courts have found 
that the child's welfare would be harmed by contact and in consequence have 
denied access. For example, access was denied where the children were caught 
in the middle of a parental "battlefield" and where they were likely to be 
subject to continuing "emotional abuse" if access was to occur.37 It has also 
been denied where access parents have subjected their children to emotional 
blackmail,38 and to outbursts of irrational conduct.39 It is further likely to 
be denied if a child is nearing the age of 16 (when the child could make 
his or her independent decisions concerning contact), and enforced access might 
33 See, for example, F v. F F.L.N.-151(2d.) and R v. C, supra n.17, at 12; also M v. H 
F.L.N. -190) (2d.). 
j4 Supra n. l I ,  at 94. 
35 See the dicta in K v. K (no 2) (1988) 5 N.Z.F.L.R. 283, at 286; also note Morris v. Huwkin, 
supra n. l I, at 547. 
3 V e e ,  for example, the judgment in the Family Court of Australia of Rourke J. in Kearon 
and Keaton (1986) F.L.C. 91 745, at (75, 435) - quoting the judgments of Treyvaud J. 
in Bishop and Bishop (1981) F.L.C. 91-016, and Selby J. in Gallaghan v. Gallaghan (1966) 
9 F.L.R. 331. In the New Zealand Family Court see T v. T F.L.N. -1 14 (2d.). Note the 
comment of Eekelaar, What are Parental Rights (1973) 89 L.Q.R. 210, 219 suggesting that 
access visits can be reasonably regarded as ". . . one of the duties of childhood". 
3' Simpson v. Simpson (1986) 2 F.R.N.Z. 637, at 640, 641; Reid v. Calder unreported, C.A. 
29/88,26 June 1989. 
38 Patterson v. Patterson (1987) 2 F.R.N.Z. 347; in Wheeler v. Wheeler (1988) 5 N.Z.F.L.R. 
380 at 383 Cooke P. declared that the virtual certainty of emotional pressure on the child 
during access visits necessitated a breach from access. (See also Judge Inglis QC's warning 
to the access parent in Brooks v. Brooks (1987) 2 F.R.N.Z. 338, at 345). 
39 Johnson v. Johnson (1986) 4 N.Z.F.L.R. 184. 
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damage the future relationship with access parenL40 
Many other examples could, of course, be given. However, because the 
long-term welfare of the child is generally thought to be promoted by continued 
contact with the noncustodial parent, it does seem more usual (if difficulties 
arise) for the court to impose conditions on access, and perhaps to decline 
overnight access, rather than to deny access altogether.41 
5. Meaning of access, and conditions 
Given that both parents normally remain guardians after separation, with 
continuing responsibilities for the upbringing of the child, it might be argued 
that, from a legal point of view, the concepts of custody and access differ 
more in degree than of kind. The difference between custody and access might 
be said to be temporal rather than qualitative. As Gault J. noted in B v. 
P2 if access involves the child moving to stay with his or her non-custodial 
parent, particularly on an overnight basis, then: 
"[Oor that period the right to possession and care conferred by custody is subject to the right 
and possession and care necessarily flowing from the right of access". 
However, his Honour did proceed to identify two significant differences 
between substantial access and joint custody.43 First, his Honour pointed out 
that if each parent enjoys custody, then section 19(1A) of the Guardianship 
Act 1968, as inserted by s. 2 of the Guardianship Amendment Act 1979, 
enjoins the issue of an enforcement warrant under s. 19(1) against a parent. 
Secondly, the Judge pointed out that custody carries greater responsibility 
as: 
". . . access is a right that need not be exercised and if it is not, the responsibilities of the custodial 
parent continue during that period". 
Thus whilst staying access may allow for the exercise of much the same 
legal privileges over the child, it does not impose the same parental 
responsibilities. Moreover, in practice, if not in law, access is often perceived 
to confer an inferior parenting status on the access parent. As Judge Inglis 
put it in Makariri v. Roxburgh," access is often perceived to be ". . . no 
more than the right to borrow the child from time to time . . .". 
It is also obvious that "access" can vary in quality, frequency, and duration. 
Indeed, as the authors of Butterworths Family Law Service suggest, access 
might not even necessitate physical contact with the child.45 Of course, access, 
if ordered, will normally involve such physical contact - though, for example, 
in Pooley v. LIewyln46 access to one of the two daughters was subject to 
the condition that the father would not attempt to see her, and similarly 
40 Collis v. Collis, supra, n.16. The Court is enjoined by section 23 (2) of the Guardianship 
Act 1968 to take account of the wishes of the child ". . . to such extent as the Court 
thinks fit, having regard to the age and maturity of the child". Here the implications of 
the decision of the House of Lords in Gillick v. Wesr Norfolk and Wsbech Area Health 
Aurhoriry [I9861 A.C. 112 are potentially significant. 
4'  Consider M v. M (1984) 1 F.R.N.Z. 388, at 397, and Walrers v. Walrers (1986) 3 F.R.N.Z. 
45. 
42 (1988) 5 N.Z.F.L.R. 65, at 69. 
43 Ibid., at 70. 
44 Supra, n. 23, at 684. Also see Judge von Dadelszen in B v. P, supra, n.25 at 473. 
45 B.F.L.S., 6033, March 1989. 
46 Supra n. 21. 
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in Adams v. K and K47 physical "access" was denied to one daughter, but 
correspondence was allowed. 
Where there are problems with physical access, it is not uncommon for 
the Court to order an initially "low level" of such access, which would be 
subject to review, and which is expected to evolve into fuller access.48 In such 
situations, access is also commonly ordered to be subject to compliance with 
certain prescribed conditions ( as authorised by section 15 (2A) of the 
Guardianship Act). There seem to be no limits to the types of conditions 
which may be imposed. They can range, for example, from a requirement 
that the access parent, intending to travel overseas with the children, post 
a substantial monetary bond49 to a somewhat more creative direction that 
an apparently immature access parent work for old and sick people in the 
area.50 
More commonly imposed is a condition to the effect that access is to take 
place under supervision. Supervisors of such access have included a social 
worker,5' a counsellor or psychologist,5* and, in a case where the access father 
had previously kidnapped his child, a plain clothes police officer.53 Conditions 
for access may also include the undertaking of counselling by the access parent,54 
both parents,55 or, possibly, by parents and child.56 
It is also possible that access may also be confined to a specifically designated 
place,57 or to a place to be designated by a counsellor, psychologist, or Counsel 
for Child.58 An access parent's partner might also be excluded from the place 
of access.59 
Thus, restricted or supervised access is often seen as the solution to difficult 
situations; but, particularly in relation to supervision, it is not easy to controvert 
the finding of the Court of Appeal in M v. M60 that such supervision does 
introduce ". . . an artificial element into access occasions which militated against 
their purpose and justification". Equally, though, it must be remembered that 
the restricted, supervised access is designed to be temporary. It is always the 
hope that restricted access will evolve into less restrictive access, taking place 
47 (1985) 1 F.R.N.Z. 653. In a recent case the Court of Appeal has ruled that whilst there 
would be "no access", occasional and unemotional correspondence would be acceptable: 
Wheeler v. Wheeler, supra n.1, cf. Reid v. Calder, supra n.37, where the Court of Appeal 
denied access and discouraged correspondence. 
4 W o n s i d e r  R v. C , supra n.37, where access was initially ordered for only one hour per 
month, and Sharman v. Sharman, supra n.1 I ,  where access was ordered for four hours 
every month; see also Shannon v. Shannon, supra n.24. 
49 Gough v. Gough (1987) 3 F.R.N.Z. 200. See also the undertakings and bond required from, 
but not provided by, an access parent living overseas: Pawley v. Reid (1988) 5 N.Z.F.L.R. 
238. 
Christie v. Christie (1988) 5 N.Z.F.L.R. 353; the direction was made under s. 13 of the 
Guardianship Act 1968. 
5 1  R v. W F.L.N. [6]. 
5 2  Sharman v. Sharman, supra n. 11, and Shannon v. Shannon, supra n.24. 
53 G v. Adams and G (1985) 2 F.R.N.Z. 14. The family psychotherapist, counsel for the access 
father, and counsel for the child were also to be present, together with the mother (if 
she wished). 
54 T v .  T(1987) 3 F.R.N.Z. 30, at 32. 
55  M v .  M(1983) 2 N.Z.F.L.R. 145, at 154. 
Sh Shannon v. Shannon, supra n. 24. Note Judge Boshier observed that there did not seem 
to seem to be any specific legislative provision for child counselling (at 319). 
5' For example, in T v. T F.L.N. -114(2d.) access was to be confined to the mental clinic 
at which the access parent was often confined. 
58  R V .  C, supra n. 17, at 13. 
59 Ev. EF.L.N.-154(2d.);seealso M v .  Msupran.41.  
F.L.N. [I311 N. 64. 
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in a more natural way and in an easier emotional context. The ideal, of course, 
would be for the issue to be decided by way of agreement between the parties.6' 
6. Sexual abuse allegations 
If an allegation of sexual abuse is raised against the putative access parent, 
then the sensitive and fair handling of the access issue becomes particularly 
difficult. First, the question of proof must be addressed. Obviously, great care 
must be taken and the allegations cannot be accepted without question.62 
Equally, though, the paramountcy principle of section 23 means that the 
resolution of the allegation must be subservient to the welfare of the child. 
As Smellie J. noted in Day v. Day63 the rules normally applying in an adversary 
situation in Courts of other jurisdiction cannot be allowed to displace the 
paramountcy of the child's welfare. A Judge may therefore accept the 
allegations, even if the civil burden of proof is not met, where there is a 
"real possibility" that the accusations are true.64 In the New Zealand High 
Court, Prichard J. has stated that he wanted to be satisfied "there was no 
risk" of future abuse;65 the High Court of Australia has recently stated that 
it would decline access (or custody) if there was "an unacceptable risk".66 
Even if the court is not satisfied, according to ordinary evidential standards, 
that "sexual abuse occurred" it may nevertheless be satisfied that there has 
been negative "physical interaction"; and such a finding will be of almost 
equal significance in the Court's ultimate determination on access.67 
Moreover, even if the Court should find itself unable to accept the allegation 
that sexual abuse, or negative physical interaction, has previously occurred, 
the very allegation may have considerable significance in an access dispute. 
Thus in Sharman v. Sharman,68 Anderson J. found that whilst there was 
"no credible evidence" relating to the allegation of sexual abuse, the "underlying 
emotional factors" leading the mother to make the allegation were relevant 
in his consideration of the issues of access and the advancement of the child's 
welfare. 
However, the case of Shannon v. Shannon,69 reveals that a finding of negative 
physical interaction will not necessarily result in a denial of all access - for 
the long-term welfare of the child might depend upon some future contact 
and relationship with the father. Thus in Shannon? case Judge Boshier 
prescribed a slow, incremental access plan, commencing initially with 
counselling for the parties (but with no physical contact between father and 
children), and progressing gradually to managed and controlled physical access. 
Just occasionally, it seems, a Judge may be prepared to grant unsupervised 
access, even where satisfied that there has been past sexual abuse,'O but such 
6' Morris v. Hawkin, supra n. l I ,  at 549, and M v. M (1985) 1 F.R.N.Z. 693, at 698. 
62 Seee.g. J v .  J(1987)  3 F.R.N.Z. 33. 
fl Unreported, High Court, Auckland Registry M. 1495185, 27 March 1986, but quoted in 
Shannon v. Shannon supra n. 24, at 3 16. 
04 Day v. Day, ibid., and M v. M, (1984) 1 F.R.N.Z. 388, at 395. 
65 H v .  O(1984)  1 F.R.N.Z,525,at526.  
hh B v. B (1988) F.L.C. 91-978; and M v. M (1988) F.L.C. 9 1-979. 
6' Shannon v. Shannon, supra n. 24. 
Supra, n. l I ,  at 93. 
fl Supra n.24. 
70 Consider T v. T (1987) 3 F.R.N.Z.  30 where the father had been convicted on a number 
of occasions of criminal offences of sexual interference with young boys, and a pyschologist's 
evidence was to the effect that he was likely to reoffend either with his own children, or 
with other children. Staying access to his two boys was granted for alternate weekends. 
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a possibility must be regarded as highly exceptional. Certainly in both 
Australia71 and the United Kingdom72 appellate court judgments indicate that 
a finding of sexual abuse is likely to result in a complete denial of physical 
access to the child who has been abused, though the position may be different 
when access is contemplated at some time in the f~ tu r e .~3  
7. Enforcement 
Assuming that the court does order access in a disputed case, the issue 
of enforcement of the order can sometimes arise. Indeed, a primary reason 
for seeking an agreement, mediated or otherwise, between the parties on 
access, is the hope that an agreed access arrangement is more likely to work. 
However, any access arrangement (both agreed and court-ordered) can fail: 
either because the access parent loses interest (in which case there is no legal 
recourse for either the child or custodial parent), or because the custodial 
parent's intransigence prevents the arrangement working, or because the child 
simply refuses to comply. 
If an intransigent custodial parent should refuse to comply with court- 
ordered access, there are potentially serious consequences. Section 20 A of 
the Guardianship Act provides for a maximum fine of $1000.00 if a person, 
without reasonable excuse and with intent, hinders or prevents another person 
exercising access which is authorised under a court order.T4 Furthermore, 
section 20A (2) expressly preserves the power of the Court to punish for 
contempt, and section 19(2) of the same Act provides for the issue of an 
enforcement warrant. 
However, punishment under s.20A (or by way of contempt proceedings) 
could sometimes be potentially damaging to the welfare of the child. For 
example, it is clearly not in the child's welfare (or in the interests of good 
access parentlchild relationships) that a custodial parent be imprisoned for 
contempt. Similarly, a financial penalty could have considerable implications 
for the child's material welfare (and this type of concern must certainly have 
been influential in the High Court ruling that a denial of access should not 
affect the level of maintenance payable).75 Quite simply, punitive measures 
are not very effective in regulating human relationships. 
Indeed, sometimes the bitterness or hatred of the custodial parent towards 
the non-custodial parent has been so absorbed by the children that the Court 
is obliged to cancel an access order, rather than attempt to enforce it.76 Yet 
if Court-ordered access is to have real meaning, and if it is to amount to 
more than posturing, then there must be the prospect of enforcement. Thus, 
Judge Inglis QC sternly warned non-complying parents in Redmond v. 
Redrn0n67~ that ". . . they defy Court orders at their peril". 
7 '  See the decisions of the High Court of Australia in M v. M and B v. B, supra n. 66 
7 2  See the decisions of the English Court of Appeal in Re R (A Minor) [I9881 1 F.L.R. 
206, and S v. S (Child Abuse: Access) [I9881 1 F.L.R. 21 3. 
73 H v. H (Child Abuse: Access) [I9891 1 F.L.R. 213. For general comment on the recent 
English cases see [I9891 Fam. Law 349-350. 
7 4  There appear, though, to be "few if any" prosecutions under this provision: Atkin, Child 
Maintenance and Access (1986) B.F.L.B. 93, 95. 
75 Shrimski v. Shrimski (1985) 3 N.Z.F.L.R. 707 per Sinclair J.  Consider the analysis of Atkin, 
ibid. 
7 h  D Y v .  DY(1985)3 N.Z.F.L.R.446. 
77  (1988) 4 N.Z.F.L.R. 697, at 698. The respondent was requested to tender a letter of apology 
to the Court, together with a formal undertaking that she would obey Court orders; warrants 
for enforcement were also issued but were to lie in Court. See also the comments of his 
Honour in C L  v. C L  (1985) 3 N.Z.EL.R. 455, at 465, and in M v. H F.L.N.- 190 (2d.) 
N.290. 
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Amongst the possible consequences hinted at by the Judge in the Redmond 
case, was the vesting of custody in the hitherto access parent.78 This possibility 
of reversal of custody was further discussed by Anderson J .  in Sharman 
v. Sharman,79 when his Honour stated that the Court has on occasion 
considered the option ". . . reluctantly but deliberately if it is the only way 
the child's welfare can be advanced". It can be noted, though, that whilst 
reversal of custody might be an available option if the issue of custody has 
previously been finely balanced, it would presumably cease to be available 
if the Court had previously awarded custody to a preferred parent after some 
deliberation, and for some good reason. 
Another possibility for the enforcement of an order, in the face of 
intransigence by the custodial parent, is by making a wardship order, removing 
the child from the custody of both parents80 - again, though, this could 
be quite inappropriate and damaging in some family relationships. Perhaps, 
then, the most realistic and helpful approach may be for the Court simply 
to require a written undertaking from the custodial parent that he or she 
will not prejudice, or interfere with, the exercise of access rights.8' 
In addition to the above options, and the punitive measures of section 
20A, passing consideration can be given to the issue of enforcement warrants 
under section 19(2). If it is the child who should refuse to comply with an 
order, the enforcement machinery of section 19 may seem singularly heavy- 
handed and inapt; most would share Judge Gilbert's view expressed in Simpson 
v. Simpson82 that the use of force by the police or social worker to remove 
a reluctant child to an access parent's home is "unthinkable". Holland J .  
has certainly expressed a similar distaste, but in H v. C83 his Honour did 
hold that unless "serious physical or mental harm" was likely to come to 
the eleven-year-old girl in question he would ensure that the access order 
was enforced. In that case, His Honour conceded there would be short term 
distress for the girl in the eventuality of section 19 enforcement, but his 
Honour believed that access was in the girl's long-term welfare. 
8 .  Conclusion 
To some, that approach of Holland J .  may be seen as the very exemplar 
of the futility of judicial involvement in access disputes. Yet, to adapt Mnookin's 
all family decision-making and all professional work with families 
(whether it be counselling, negotiating, mediating) must take place "in the 
shadow of the law". It may thus be useful for everyone involved in access 
disputes, both professionals and parties, to be reminded from time to time 
that the law is not in a state of total eclipse. It may be useful to be reminded, 
when consideration is being given to the welfare of the child, that the law, 
and law reports, are not entirely inconsequential. 
78 Ibid., at 700; see also H v. C ,  supra n. 18, at 34 per Holland J. 
79 Supra 11.11, at 94. 
8" Ibid. 
See B.F.L.S. 6076, August 1989; for an example, see Pooley v. Llewelyn supra n. 21. 
82 Supra n. 37, at 642. 
83 Supra n. 18, at 35. 
84 See the article of Mnookin and Kornhauser Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The 
Case of Divorce (1979) 88 Yale L.J. 950. 
